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Abstract
Background: International trade regulations require that countries document their livestock's
sanitary status in general and freedom from specific infective agents in detail provided that import
restrictions should be applied. The latter is generally achieved by large national serological surveys
and risk assessments. The paper describes the basic structure and application of a generic
stochastic model for risk-based sample size calculation of consecutive national surveys to
document freedom from contagious disease agents in livestock.
Methods: In the model, disease spread during the time period between two consecutive surveys
was considered, either from undetected infections within the domestic population or from
imported infected animals. The @Risk model consists of the domestic spread in-between two
national surveys; the infection of domestic herds from animals imported from countries with a
sanitary status comparable to Switzerland or lower sanitary status and the summary sheet which
summed up the numbers of resulting infected herds of all infection pathways to derive the pre-
survey prevalence in the domestic population. Thereof the pre-survey probability of freedom from
infection and required survey sample sizes were calculated. A scenario for detection of infected
herds by general surveillance was included optionally.
Results:  The model highlights the importance of residual domestic infection spread and
characteristics of different import pathways. The sensitivity analysis revealed that number of
infected, but undetected domestic herds and the multiplicative between-survey-spread factor were
most correlated with the pre-survey probability of freedom from infection and the resulting sample
size, respectively. Compared to the deterministic pre-cursor model, the stochastic model was
therefore more sensitive to the previous survey's results. Undetected spread of infection in the
domestic population between two surveys gained more importance than infection through animals
of either import pathway.
Conclusion: The model estimated the pre-survey probability of freedom from infection accurately
as was shown in the case of infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR). With this model, a generic tool
becomes available which can be adapted to changing conditions related to either importing or
exporting countries.
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Background
In 2002, Hadorn and co-workers showed how to combine
confidence obtained in a survey conducted previously and
the risk of disease introduction thereafter [1]. To quantify
the residual confidence at the beginning of the following
survey, quantitative and qualitative risk assessment meth-
ods were used. In this deterministic model the potential
risk of undetected infected herds spreading the infectious
agent in-between two surveys in the population under
study was not considered. This limited the approach to
non-highly contagious diseases, because the number of
infected herds is nearly constant in-between two surveys.
Based on the agricultural agreement from 1999, Annex 11,
and the bilateral agreements with the EU new import reg-
ulations for cattle have been implemented in Switzerland
on 1st July 2004 [2]. These regulations lead to a distinc-
tion of sanitary categories of breeding cattle import to
Switzerland and hence different import pathways
depicted in Figure 1.
The main objective of this study was to incorporate the
spread of infection in the model to obtain an improved
estimate of the pre-survey probability of freedom (pre-
SPF), and, in consequence, the minimal required sample
size for national surveys to demonstrate freedom from
more rapidly spreading disease agents. The second objec-
tive was to consider changes in the EU-import regulations
and third, to investigate implications of disease awareness
and general surveillance in Switzerland. This stochastic
model should be of a generic type and adaptable to a wide
range of infectious agents. The use and parameterization
of the model were illustrated on the example of infectious
bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR).
Methods
The model structure was based on the current import reg-
ulations and possible infection links to the domestic pop-
ulation (Figure 1). International guidelines of import risk
analysis [6] were followed throughout the model con-
struction. The model was realised in three sub-models and
a summarizing part: The first sub-model was dedicated to
the spread of undetected infection within the domestic
population; two sub-models accounted for infection via
imported animals, either originating from countries that
are officially free from the infective agent or from coun-
tries where the infective agent and the disease is present.
The outputs of the three sub-models were cumulative
Basic model structure and cattle import pathways Figure 1
Basic model structure and cattle import pathways. Basic structure of the stochastic simulation model to estimate the 
pre-survey probability of freedom from infection as applied to BoHV-1. Three main pathways of infectious agent introduction 
into the susceptible domestic population were considered. + = infected, - = uninfected, D = infection status of animal, T = diag-
nostic test status of animal, H = herd status
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probability distributions of numbers of infected herds. In
the summarizing part of the model, the resulting numbers
of infected farms of each sub-model were summed up per
iteration to the final simulation output. From 1'000 itera-
tions, a probability distribution of the updated herd prev-
alence prior to the survey was derived. This prevalence
distribution was used to derive the point estimate pre-SPF
from infection in the national cattle population and, sub-
sequently, to calculate the sample size for the planned sur-
vey. For simulation and distribution details we refer to
Table 1.
Uncertainty and variability were incorporated using prob-
ability distributions of parameters and Monte Carlo sim-
ulation (@Risk, Palisade Tools, Version 4.5.2.). The
correlation of input parameters with output parameters
was based on Spearman rank correlation coefficient calcu-
lations (significance level of p ≤ 0.05). The following par-
agraphs elucidate the detailed structure and calculations
steps of each sub-model, on the example of BoHV-1.
Undetected domestic infection and domestic spread of the 
infectious agent
Undetected residual infection and potential spread
between herds in the domestic population was included
in the model. The range for the residual herd prevalence
(HP) was sampled from a beta distribution. The distribu-
tion was defined by the previous survey size (N) and
detected positive herds in the previous survey (s), beta
(s+1;N-s+1).
The potential between-survey spread was interpreted as a
multiplicative transmission factor which would approxi-
mately predict annual changes in HP due to disease spread
between herds. This between-survey spread factor (BSSF),
was empirically derived for annual periods, between two
consecutive surveys in years (k and k+1) from the means
(μ) of HP beta distributions:
All annual BSSF values were derived from data of the dis-
ease-specific national surveys from 1994–2005 and
descriptive statistics provided minimum, maximum and
most likely values (median) for a beta pert distribution. A
worst case scenario was assumed, which did not allow for
a decrease in HP (BSSF ≥1 in all runs).
To account for disease awareness and general surveillance,
the option for a binomial detection probability was
included for newly infected herds. Newly infected herds
were defined as the number of herds that were infected by
domestic spread during the time between two surveys. In
the case of BoHV-1, studies from the Netherlands [7] on
unvaccinated, certified BoHV-1 free herds indicated that
only about 80% of new infections on herd level result in
perceived "major" outbreaks with potential of further
spread to additional herds. In the other 20% of infected
herds (M) the within herd prevalence (whp) of infection
would be very low and the likelihood of immediate
spread to other cows and herds is less likely. The infection
theoretically might even die out due to random culling. It
BSSF
beta HP
beta HP
k
k
k
+
+ = 1
1 μ
μ
()
()
(1)
Table 1: Description of baseline model input parameter values and sources. Input values or distributions of parameters used to model 
the import probability and domestic spread of BoHV-1 in Switzerland between annual serological surveys.
Parameter Values or distribution as used in @RISK simulation Reference
Population size See Table 2 Swiss animal movement database
Sample size last survey See Table 2 [8]
Number of herds tested positive See Table 2 [8]
Threshold herd prevalence 0.1–0.2% a) 64/432/ECC 2004/78/EC
Between survey spread factor (BSSF) = RiskPert(1;1.03;3.96) derived as explained in the text
Probability of detection = RiskBinomial(number of newly infected herds; 0.2) [7]
Number and seasonality of animals imports records per month and country Swiss Fed. Custom Statistics
Herd prevalence countries not BoHV-1 free = RiskUniform(0.1;0.3) [9, 10]
Herd prevalence countries BoHV-1 free = RiskBeta(1;2326) 64/432/ECC
Within herd prevalence countries not free = RiskUniform(0.1;0.5) b) [11, 12]
Within herd prevalence countries free = RiskUniform(0.1;0.9) b) [13–15]
Test sensitivity 1 = RiskUniform(0.87;0.99) [10, 16, 17]
Test specificity 1 = RiskUniform(0.95;1)
Isolation facility group size = 7 [18]
Transmission probability = RiskUniform(0.25;0.35) expert opinion
Test sensitivity 2 = RiskUniform(0.2;0.9175) [3], expert opinion
Test specificity 2 = 1 c) [3], expert opinion
a) changes in regulation see Table 2
b) dependant on vaccination policy and coverage or eradication programme strategies
c) any positive screening test result would be subject to confirmatory testingBMC Veterinary Research 2007, 3:10 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/3/10
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was assumed that farmers and veterinary practitioners
would notice or ignore new outbreaks on herd level,
depending on the patterns of within herd spread and
prevalence of clinical signs of the disease, which is also
related to virulence of virus strain. In the case of a noticed
outbreak, control measures would be implemented and
further spread from herd to herd halted. The probability
of undetected infected herds (Q) was defined as follows:
Where Q is the number of undetected, infected herds, M
is the number of newly infected herds and p(nond) is 1-
probability of detection. The probability of Q was then
multiplied with M  to obtain the number of domestic
undetected infected herds within the country before the
next survey.
Infection via direct import
Only animals from countries with sanitary conditions
comparable to Switzerland were admitted for direct
import (Figure 1). This import pathway included no sero-
logical testing, therefore the probability of importing
infected animals was derived from the animal level preva-
lence and a binomial selection process for export in the
country of origin. Data from previous surveys in the coun-
try of origin were used to estimate the expected residual
HP as described above. Otherwise standard requirements
of EU regulations (64/432/EEC) were used as a basis to
define the HP beta distribution (N > 2300, s = 0).
Based on the prevalence of infection in imported animals
(prev) and the number of animals imported (n), the prob-
abilities of selecting 1 or 2 or 3...to x infected animals (m)
for import were calculated. The total number of imported
infected animals (mtotal) from a specific country and for
the whole import pathway was obtained by Eq. 3:
where prev = HP * whp
Cattle are imported throughout the whole year. The dis-
ease transmission potential of infected import animals
needed therefore to be adjusted (BSSFadj). The remaining
time within the domestic population until the next survey
was considered by a time weighting factor (twx) on a
monthly basis. The starting point in the year was set just
after the Swiss national surveys that are usually carried out
in March. Origin and average numbers and of monthly
imported animals from the last three years were used to
determine the monthly import probabilities p(imp):
BSSFadj = BSSF * twx* p(imp)t = x (4)
The expected total number of infected animals of Eq. 3
was then multiplied with each monthly BSSFadj value to
consider the spread until the next survey accurately. The
sum of all monthly estimates provided the total number
of infected animals through direct import. It was assumed
that each infected animal would result in one infected
domestic herd (worst case scenario).
Infection via indirect import
This import pathway was applied for cattle originating
from countries or regions having a lower sanitary status,
thus considered not officially free from the infectious dis-
ease agent or in our case BoHV-1 (Figure 1). Animals of
the indirect pathway were supposed to be kept in quaran-
tine or isolation facilities in groups and to undergo two
serological testing rounds (Figure 1). If an animal tested
positive in the quarantine of the export country it was
excluded. If at least one animal tested positive in the sec-
ond testing round in the isolation facility in Switzerland,
the whole group was rejected. In consequence, the condi-
tional probability that an infected group was released to
the destination farm was the probability of the group to
have at least one infected animal given that all animals
were negative reactors, also in the second serological test-
ing round.
Only animals that tested negative in the first testing round
were admissible for importation. The probability to intro-
duce a certain number x of infected animals (mstart) into
each isolation facility of group size (g) in Switzerland was
given by the probability of selecting animals having a false
negative test result in the exporting country. Therefore the
test sensitivity of the first serological test in the export
country (Se1) was included:
In view of the required minimum isolation facility period
in Switzerland, the model accounted for the probability of
transmission of an undetected infection within the isola-
tion group and detection by the second serological test
before the group was admitted to the destination farm.
The number of potentially infected animals within the
isolation facility group at the end (mend) of the isolation
period were obtained by inclusion of the transmission
probability p(trans) and the number of infected animals
within the group at start of the isolation (mstart):
mend = (g - mstart) * (p(trans) * (g - mstart)/g) + mstart (6)
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The probability that all animals of the isolation facility
group were not infected and still test negative (allD-|T--)
at the end of the period was further dependant on the test
sensitivity (Se2) and specificity (Sp2) of the second testing
round:
Therefore the probability that the group contained at least
one infected, not detected animal at the end of the isola-
tion facility period was 1- p(all D-|T--). In a final step, the
resulting number of infected groups was summed up and
then multiplied by BSSFadj, as described in the direct
import pathway. In the indirect import pathway, all ani-
mals from one infected group were assumed to be deliv-
ered to the same farm and to infect it.
Pre-survey prevalence and pre-survey probability of 
freedom
In each of the 5,000 iteration runs of the model, the
expected number of infected herds of each pathway was
summed up to a final number of infected herds before the
next survey. The resulting pre-survey prevalence in the
domestic population (N = 50'000 herds) was expressed as
a probability distribution. With regard to the internation-
ally required HP-threshold level and the defined confi-
dence (Table 1), the pre-SPF from infection was derived
directly from the HP's cumulative probability distribution
as the proportion of the sampled values that lay beyond
the threshold HP. Starting from the overall level of confi-
dence required (γ) and pre-SPF estimate, the required con-
fidence level z (1 - type-I error) for the consecutive survey
can be calculated by Eq.8 of Hadorn et al. [1]:
Data on bovine herpes virus 1
BoHV-1 data used as input for the parameterization of the
stochastic model originated from the surveillance pro-
gramme, import and trading statistics, literature as well as
expert opinion on infection dynamics (Table 2). The erad-
ication of clinical cases related to BoHV-1 was accom-
plished in 1992. Currently, Switzerland is officially free
from BoHV-1. Since 1994, Switzerland has conducted
annual serological surveys to substantiate claims of free-
dom from BoHV-1. From 2002 onwards, quantitative and
qualitative RA, together with the information from the
last year's survey, provided the basis for risk-based sample
size calculations for consecutive surveys as described by
Hadorn et al. [1]. Detailed data on conducted or planned
Swiss BoHV-1 surveys from 2002–2007 are shown in
Table 2. The model did not account for cattle that were
imported for slaughter, because spread of infectious
agents from them to the domestic population was
assumed to be unlikely.
p allD T Sp
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g
Se gm end
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end
end
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Table 2: Results and parameterization of the stochastic model with Swiss national survey data on BoHV-1. Detailed information on 
BoHV-1 surveys conducted or planned from 2002–2007 in Swiss cattle and pre-survey probability of freedom estimates using 
deterministic and stochastic model approaches. Sample sizes of previous surveys in the stochastic model: (SSS) standard sample size 
calculation or (RBS) sample size calculation as described by Eq. 8.
Input values 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 a) 2007 a)
Population size (number of cattle herds) 50,591 48,231 48,790 46,574 46,574 46,300
Allowed threshold herd level prevalence 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002b) 0.002 0.002
Number of positive herds detected in previous survey 0 1 0 0 1 0
Sample size of previous survey RBS 632 2400 2274 2828 1430 1550
Sample size of previous survey SSS 4650 4650 4650 2325 2325 2325
n direct imports from BoHV-1-free countries c) c) c) 155 976 552
n indirect imports from BoHV-1-infected countries 500d) 8 e) 496 1145 388 658
n indirect imports, national eradication of BoHV-1 accomplished but not officially free 344 680
Remaining pre-SPF from the last survey, deterministic model [1] 0.8910 0.9094 0.8371 0.8947 0.8201 0.8618
Remaining pre-SPF from the last survey, stochastic model f) (RBS) 0.9516 0.4958 0.7826 0.9740 0.5866 0.8320
Remaining pre-SPF from the last survey, (RBS) and bin. detection probability of 0.8 0.9856 0.6406 0.872 0.9936 0.7312 0.9336
Remaining pre-SPF from the last survey, stochastic model (SSS) 0.9516 0.8106 0.9516 0.9958 0.8104 0.9514
a) planned surveys that are not carried out yet or analysis not completed
b) adaptation of Swiss regulation to European animal disease surveillance regulation
c) Swiss regulation on cattle import changed in July 2004, specific distinction between animal imports originating from EU countries officially free or 
not free from certain diseases
d) due e) qualitative risk-assessment only. The import number was adjusted to n = 500 for the model input to obtain comparable results with the 
qualitative estimate
e) import stop due to foot and mouth disease outbreaks in Europe 2001
f) the stochastic model developed and investigated in this publicationBMC Veterinary Research 2007, 3:10 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/3/10
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Results
The model consisted of three separate sub-models and a
summarising part: Consideration of 1) disease spread
from undetected infected domestic herds; 2) introduction
of infection due to import from a disease free country with
an equivalent livestock health status; 3) introduction of
infection due to import from a non disease free country
with a lower livestock health status, and 4) a summarizing
sub-model calculating the pre-SPF and the required sam-
ple size for the next survey.
Sensitivity analysis
The rank correlation of input parameters showed that the
pre-survey prevalence and hence the pre-SPF was most
correlated with the remaining baseline HP within Switzer-
land (r = 0.97) and modestly with values of the between
survey spread factor (BSSF) (r = 0.20). Infection through
direct import from countries officially free from BoHV-1
was most correlated with the HP in the country of origin
(r = 0.76) and to lesser extent with the number of
imported animals and the assumed whp for infected herds
in the country of origin (r = 0.46 and 0.32, respectively).
Estimates of infection caused by indirect import from
countries not officially free from BoHV-1 was also
dependant on the number of imported animals (r = 0.36).
Increasing isolation facility group size in the indirect
import pathway was negatively correlated with the model
outcome pre-SPF (r = -0.14). The impact of the value of
the between survey spread factor, which was adjusted for
import seasonality (BSSFadj), on both, direct and indirect
import pathway outcomes, was negligible (r<0.1).
The residual domestic HP  prior to the next survey
accounted for 96.97% (95% CI 96.63–97.31%) of the
pre-survey prevalence estimate on average, whereas the
mean contribution of the direct import pathway was
1.55% (1.40–1.70%) and 0.29% (0.24–0.33%) of the
indirect import pathway, respectively. The inclusion of a
binomial detection probability increased the correlation
of pre-survey prevalence with the inland prevalence to r =
0.99. Second high-ranking contribution to the pre-survey
prevalence was the number of undetected infected herds
defined by the binomial detection probability (r = 0.73).
All other model parameters ranked thereafter showed neg-
ligible correlations of r<0.1. For the outcome of the indi-
vidual direct and indirect import pathways, no relevant
change in parameter ranking or correlation coefficients
was observed.
Exploration of model structure and behaviour
Herd prevalence
Figure 2 presents the increase of the predicted model pre-
survey prevalence distribution in relation to an increasing
residual  HP  within the importing country. Step-wise
increments of the residual HP were simulated by increas-
ing discrete numbers of positive samples (s = 0 to 5) from
a previous survey of a fixed sample size (N = 2400). This
sample size accounted for possible ranges of imperfect test
characteristics and was sufficient to prove a HP < 0.2% at
a 99% confidence level. Starting without infected herds,
one more infected herd detected in the previous survey
implicated a mean of 29.5 more infected herds before the
next survey and a loss in pre-SPF of 18.2% per additional
positive survey finding. Each increase in HP  by 0.1%
shortly after the last survey lead to 75.6 more infected
herds.
BSSF
BSSF values ranged from 1.00 to 3.96, (median 1.03). The
mean pre-survey prevalence and the pre-SPF displayed a
linear relationship with BSSF. Each one-unit-increase in
BSSF reduced the baseline pre-SPF by 11.22%. Where
BSSF = 1 meant no spread, BSSF = 2, infected herds dou-
bled through spread in-between two surveys. If a decline
in the number of infected herds between two surveys was
accepted (BSSF and BSSFadj values <1 to ≥1), lower pre-
survey HP in the sub-model outputs were observed. The
difference in HP between the two scenarios, namely BSSF
values ≥1 and BSSF values <1 to ≥1, had different signifi-
cance levels depending on the infection pathway: Result-
ing HP of undetected infected domestic herds p = 0.011;
infected herds from import from a country with an equiv-
alent livestock health status p = 0.015; import from a
Cumulative probability distribution of pre-survey prevalence  with increasing numbers of positive samples detected Figure 2
Cumulative probability distribution of pre-survey 
prevalence with increasing numbers of positive sam-
ples detected. Effect of increasing residual herd prevalence 
(HP) on the pre-survey prevalence estimates prior to the 
consecutive survey at a threshold HP of 0.2% (vertical black 
bar). Pre-survey herd prevalence was estimated using cumu-
lative herd prevalence beta-distributions defined by a fixed 
sample size (N = 2400) and increasing numbers of positive 
samples
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country with a lower livestock health status p = 0.14 (no
significant difference).
Numbers of imported animals
The model predicted one more newly infected domestic
herd per 4,765 directly imported animals. In the case of
indirect import, the restrictive import requirements lim-
ited the introduction of infected groups and animals such
that a mean of 9207 indirectly imported animals or 1315
groups of 7 animals respectively, resulted in one newly
infected herd only. If we applied the same scenarios for
indirect and direct import pathways, namely that each
infected animal (instead of an infected group) lead to one
additional infected domestic herd, the outcome of the
indirect import pathway increased by a factor of 2.85.
Within herd prevalence
The sub-model "direct import" was run with an increasing
whp using fixed values from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.2. A
whp of 0.9 implicated at most 1.84 additional infected
herds (mean = 0.19) assuming n = 500 directly imported
animals in this pathway. The application of sampled whp
values from a uniform distribution, ranging from 0.1 to
0.9 returned a maximum of 1.67 (mean = 0.11) addi-
tional infected herds.
Application using Swiss BoHV-1 survey data
The input values derived from the Swiss BoHV-1 surveil-
lance programme and comparative results of the deter-
ministic precursor model [1] and of the developed
stochastic model outputs are listed in Table 2. About half
of the decrease in the pre-SPF of the deterministic model
was due to import of animals, mainly direct import (data
not shown). The other half of the decrease in pre-SPF of
the deterministic model accounted for a fixed margin for
potential spread and qualitative RA aspects. In the sto-
chastic model, the estimation of the residual HP consid-
ered infection from both the domestic and the foreign
cattle population. Under these conditions, the residual
domestic  HP  and the outcome of the previous survey
became more influential in determining the pre-SPF. In
consequence, important pre-SPF differences between the
model results for the years 2003 and 2006 were observed
(Table 2). These years were preceded by surveys that
detected an infected domestic herd. If a scenario with a
detection probability for newly infected herds was
applied, the decline in pre-SPF was less distinct (Table 2).
The difference in pre-SPF with a detection probability was
highly significant (p < 0.001) if compared to the values of
the deterministic model or to the stochastic model (using
either risk-based or standard sample sizes for calculation).
The consequences for the minimal required sample sizes
and their 95% confidence intervals of the different scenar-
ios using the stochastic model are depicted in Figure 3. In
the situation where the previous survey outcome was neg-
ative, the stochastic model predicted significantly higher
pre-SPF compared to the estimate from the deterministic
model (Table 2, years 2002, 2004–2005 and 2007).
Discussion
The stochastic model presented here is a comprehensive
combination of quantitative RA components and disease
transmission components to simulate both, the spread of
disease within a country and the probability of introduc-
tion of the infectious agent. The flexible structure of the
stochastic model reflecting the current import regulations
allows including various additional domestic or import-
related risk factors, such as short term animal movements
or infection via livestock commodities. Such factors can
be incorporated directly as additional numbers of infected
herds to the summarizing sub-model or – if necessary –
can be incorporated as separate spreadsheet models.
Information on numbers of infected herds or animals and
the cause of infection are normally available from statu-
tory case reporting or diagnostic laboratory records.
The first objective of the study, to regard the consideration
of infection spread between two consecutive surveys was
Comparative sample size of serological surveys derived from  the pre-SPF Figure 3
Comparative sample size of serological surveys 
derived from the pre-SPF. Comparative sample sizes for 
the follow-up survey derived from the model output pre-sur-
vey probability of infection freedom (pre-SPF). Standard sam-
ple sizes (SSS), risk-based sample sizes (RBS), with or without 
detection of newly infected herds, were used to define the 
herd prevalence (HP) of the previous survey. Ninety-five per-
cent confidence intervals of pre-survey probability of infec-
tion freedom and hence resulting sample sizes, were 
obtained by exact binomial confidence intervals based on the 
proportion of iterations with values < 0.2 and < 0.1%, 
respectively, to the total number of iterations performed. 
Sample sizes were calculated with Survey Toolbox® assuming 
a population of 50,000 herds, 99% herd sensitivity for diag-
nostic testing and a threshold HP of 0.2% and 0.1%, respec-
tively.
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achieved by the introduction of BSSF and BSSFadj for
spread from domestic herds and imported animals,
respectively. Compared to the deterministic precursor
model, where a preliminary fixed value for the potential
spread between surveys was included, the pre-SPF of the
stochastic model reflected disease dynamics more realisti-
cally. In the context of repeated surveys, the model high-
lighted the potential importance of residual infections
within the domestic population of a country or region
officially free from the disease and the infectious agent,
respectively. Especially when a country has to deal with
rapidly spreading infections that are characterized by
latent phases or that might show only mild to in-apparent
clinical signs.
With the introduction of a novel spread factor, explicit
transmission modelling in terms of a SIR model was
avoided. Depending on the infectious agent's epidemiol-
ogy, the model allowed in the worst case scenario only for
an increase of HP (BSSF ≥1) between two consecutive sur-
veys, whereas the alternative scenario allowed also for a
decrease of HP between two surveys (BSSF values < 1 to
≥1). The alternative scenario modelled a natural extinc-
tion course of infection in the case of chronic or slowly
spreading infectious agents (e.g. bovine leucosis virus),
whereas the worst case scenario was more adapted to rap-
idly spreading infections with latent disease phases fol-
lowed by reactivation (e.g. BoHV-1). The different model
outputs of the two scenarios above were related to the
influence of BSSF on the outcome of the individual infec-
tion pathways, as highlighted in the sensitivity analysis of
model input parameters.
To include the changes in the EU-import regulations, the
BSSF was adjusted for seasonality of import and categories
of export countries, this realistically reflected the complex
dynamics of cattle populations and the trading patterns
between two surveys. However, sound data are lacking to
consider spread from clustered outbreaks or clustered
sources of infection. As an approximation to clustered
spread from imported animals to domestic herds, the
release of animals from the two import pathways to their
destination farms were treated differently: Delivery of sin-
gle animals versus groups of animals in the direct import
pathway and the indirect import pathway, respectively.
Because of the moderate contribution of the indirect path-
way to the final model output, a scenario where individ-
ual animals were released each to different destination
herds did not significantly affect the model's final out-
come. The distinct separation of release patterns per
import pathway category was therefore a pragmatic
approach to address the second objective of the study, but
release of groups or single animals in reality may also
occur in the other pathway. Consistent data on grouping
and delivery patterns to destination farms are expected in
future, as the new import regulations have been applied
only since July 2004. In the future the model could be
adapted to account for heterogeneous spread (clustering
of outbreaks), or different susceptibilities of herds for
infection (e.g. due to potential risk factors such as larger
herd size or intense animal movements, known from
other countries).
The high influence of residual domestic HP on the pre-SPF
in the model was not surprising (Figure 2): The adoption
of risk-based national surveys presumably shifted the
mean of the assumed residual HP  beta-distribution to
higher values due to a smaller sample size. Model outputs
pointed out a significant increase in pre-SPF exceeding the
estimates of the deterministic model (Table 2), when
using hypothetical standard sample sizes to define input
HP.
With regard to the third objective of the study, the option
of including a detection probability of newly infected
herds in terms of general surveillance showed significantly
higher pre-SPF estimates, too. In the case of rapidly
spreading infections disease notification and interven-
tions to halt the course of an epidemic are to be expected.
In the case of parameterization of the model with BoHV-
1 we tested and excluded the scenario that included
aspects of general surveillance and detection of outbreaks,
although the outputs suggested lower HP and higher Pre-
SPF estimates. The only estimate for detection probability
for BoHV-1 available was derived from a study on Dutch
dairy herds that might have different herd sizes and man-
agement strategies [4,5]. However, more investigations on
detection probabilities of BoHV-1 outbreaks of countries
officially free from the infectious agent would lead to
reconsideration of this scenario.
For BoHV-1 data and surveys, it was demonstrated, how
to account for various factors affecting the health status
and disease dynamics of a national cattle population
between two surveys to substantiate freedom from infec-
tion. The present model was also successfully applied to
national risk-based surveillance for freedom from bovine
leucosis virus, the causative infectious agent of enzootic
bovine leucosis, a more chronic disease and less conta-
gious infection (data not shown).
The number of resulting infected domestic herds through
imported BoHV-1 positive animals per pathway was in
line with findings of European risk assessments [3]. E.g.
the contribution of infection through animals originating
from countries not BoHV-1 free was considered very
small, because of the high likelihood of detection of pos-
itive animals during pre-export quarantine. Whereas
introduction of positive animals from countries BoHV-1Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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free was mainly dependant on the export country's survey
results or the assumed HP. Experts also mentioned sani-
tary conditions during up-loading and transport to be an
additional source of infection, but in the present study
detailed data from export countries on transport condi-
tions were unavailable.
Our BSSF validation suggested realistic values if compared
to reports from other BoHV-1-free countries or regions
that conduct full surveys. Reporting from Denmark, Bol-
zano and Austria indicated that spread of infection
between herds was very limited, usually 0–1 secondary
cases [3].
Conclusion
The stochastic model is an improved approach to deter-
mine risk-based sample sizes for repeated surveys to sub-
stantiate claims of freedom on contagious diseases. With
this model, a generic tool becomes available which can be
adapted to the changing conditions either in the import-
ing and exporting countries or to the disease dynamics.
This tool is applicable to the risk-based survey design of a
wide range of infectious diseases.
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